Sound Money Strikes at the Root: A Review Essay on The Bitcoin Standard

1.   The gold standard book on Bitcoin

The Bitcoin Standard: The Decentralized Alternative to Central Banking (2018) by Saifedean Ammous is the gold standard book on Bitcoin. Instead of viewing Bitcoin news in terms of days, week, or even years, it views Bitcoin in the perspective of centuries of monetary history.

In considering this book, I revisited my own economic and legal-theory analyses of Bitcoin, which for the most part cover harmonious, though distinct, territory. The result is a review essay, part book review and part in-depth discussion. A follow-up paper is planned to expand on some of the issues further, particularly where I have now reframed a perspective suggested in my previous writings.

In an unusual, but I think effective, editorial choice, the book’s first 60% is not about Bitcoin, but instead provides essential theoretical and historical background for grasping the scale of Bitcoin’s significance. It walks through the theory and history of money and proto-money collectibles, particularly informed by the Austrian school of economics. A central theme is the role of sound money versus inflationary money in the evolution of societies and cultures, and the wealth and poverty of nations.

Austrian school approaches, in which I had been immersed for years prior to encountering Bitcoin, were the launching point for my writings on the subject, which appeared primarily from 2013–2015 (assembled on my Bitcoin Theory page). For those who do not yet have such a perspective on money—alas, the vast majority—Ammous brings them up to speed in admirable fashion while including details and formulations likely to be useful to veterans as well.

What I immediately considered most intriguing about Bitcoin was its pre-determined monetary policy for an asymptotically declining inflation rate, eventually terminating at zero. It is just such recognition of the centrality of monetary policy to Bitcoin’s importance that Ammous conveys throughout.

I assumed that such should likewise have been apparent to others versed in the Austrian school. That it was not, and that Bitcoin was the target of attacks from hard money advocates, became the launching point for my research. Inflationists and money cranks would obviously hate Bitcoin, but what was preventing so many of those with a pro-hard-money perspective from seeing its potential to become a sound money?

I re-examined economic concepts as grounded in the theory of action in the Austrian tradition (praxeology), such as goods, commodity, scarcity, and rivalness, as well as Mises’s regression theorem and Menger’s evolutionary account of monetary emergence through relative liquidity. I argued that each concept and formulation can be applied independently of any need for a material “base” for the goods in question.

Moreover, Austrian-school accounts of the origins and functions of money could be applied to interpret the historical data on Bitcoin’s early evolution. Bitcoin’s history formed a new free-market monetary origin story, one not hidden by the mists of time, but plainly documented over the course of 2009–2011, as discussed in my late-2013 monograph, On the Origins of Bitcoin: Stages of Monetary Evolution (PDF).

It seemed that historical associations of sound money with material backing were keeping some sound-money advocates from seeing that bitcoin could be a commodity and a hard monetary commodity at that. A commodity contrasts with a more specialized good and is characterized by the full interchangeability of products from different producers. In this case, the producers in question are Bitcoin miners and the coins they produce are fungible rather than distinguished or specialized (see my “Commodity, scarcity, and monetary value theory in light of Bitcoin,” [PDF] (Prices & Markets, 20 Oct 2015)).

The economic meaning of hard is, as Ammous explains, difficult to produce more units of in response to increases in demand (5). What is it that makes a monetary unit resistant to production growth? There are many possibilities. Having a particular chemical composition is but one.

Bitcoin’s inflation-resistance rests on a novel basis, as described in my late-2014 article, “Bitcoin: Magic, fraud, or ‘sufficiently advanced technology’? Yet most Bitcoin critics were not beginning to grasp the layered technical underpinnings of this. They assumed that bitcoins, as digital objects, must be copiable and therefore unreliable. Yet what all the fuss was about was precisely that bitcoin units were the first digital objects that are not copiable in this way. Quite the contrary, they constitute a new class of scarcity, never before seen, which Ammous labels absolute scarcity (177).

Ammous emphasizes stock/flow ratio as a practical comparative measure of monetary hardness (5–6). As demand to hold a unit rises, can its production be profitably increased? And if so, by how much? It is quite difficult to expand production of gold in response to an increase in demand for it. Moreover, since gold is effectively indestructible, its stock has risen over the centuries relative to the flow of annual mine production. This explains gold’s unique superiority as a monetary asset, even to this day.

Yet Bitcoin is an entirely new development in this regard. Its unit production cannot be expanded at all in response to increased demand. Due to its difficulty-adjustment algorithm, the more processing power comes on line, the more is required to extract new coin. This keeps unit production on schedule no matter how many resources are thrown at accelerating it.

Nevertheless, this growing distributed processing po­wer is not wasted; it increases the network’s security by steadily raising the costs of attack (173). The energy and investment that might have been channeled into socially destructive inflation is channeled instead into increased network security, which feeds back into further inflation-resistance. As the unit-production schedule unfolds, bitcoin will in a few short years surpass, and then far exceed, gold at the top of the stock/flow ratio charts (198–99), making it the hardest monetary commodity ever known.

Cash, Ammous, argues, formerly meant not only a tradable bearer instrument but, during the classical gold standard era, a final means of settlement. It referred to physical metal (238). The modern sense of cash as pocket money has misled many into believing that bitcoin, in order to serve as digital “cash,” must be usable for everyday transactions on chain. Instead, Ammous argues that for both technical and economic reasons, on-chain bitcoin’s more potent natural role may well be as a means of settlement, largely, though not exclusively, to underpin far more efficient systems built on it. Such an arrangement would be in keeping with this older sense of the word cash.

Ammous breaks down Carl Menger’s concept of salability, central to the latter’s evolutionary account of monetary emergence, into three components: salability across space, time, and scale. He finds that Bitcoin excels in each area:

With its supply growth rate dropping below that of gold by the year 2025, Bitcoin has the supply restrictions that could make it have considerable demand as a store of value; in other words, it can have salability across time. Its digital nature that makes it easy to safely send worldwide makes it salable in space in a way never seen with other forms of money, while its divisibility into 100,000,000 satoshis makes it salable in scale. (181)

Ammous challenges the popular notion that “blockchain technology” is likely to be useful for much else than decentralized digital cash, that is, Bitcoin (257–72). He examines the “other use cases” advertised for altcoins (non-bitcoin cryptocurrencies) and finds that each suffers from a similar problem—centralized and conventional database methods can or could do most or all of these things more efficiently and at less cost than a block chain. A decentralized block chain is a burdensome and costly design. What it produces must be valuable and unique enough to justify its costs.

With Bitcoin, the block chain arrived as the unexpected solution to a well-defined problem. Many “other use cases” are solutions looking for problems—not to mention windfalls, venture capital, research grants, or social tracking and control leverage. Some useful applications may emerge for private and centralized blockchain-like structures, such as for internal cross border transfers, as some large banks have already begun using, but this is entirely different from decentralized digital cash on a public permissionless network, suitable for use with complete stranger counterparties.

2.   From monetary policy to immutability

Parts of Chapter 10 (217–274) highlight Bitcoin’s incentives for different types of participants, such as the importance of decentralized full node operators independently choosing which software to run, the desire of developers to offer software that will be used, and the incentives for miners to stay on the dominant network. The theme here is that much of the Bitcoin network’s worth, in light of its valuable fixed monetary policy, lies in resistance to consensus-rule changes. Any change requiring a backward-incompatible hard fork to the network must attract sufficient support among relevant parties that enough of them switch in a timely way; otherwise the network could split into incompatible chains.

Cryptocurrencies created after Bitcoin, Ammous argues, suffer here from the outsized presence of founding development teams or other identifiable backers.

Without active management by a team of developers and marketers, no digital currency will attract any attention or capital in a sea of 1,000+ currencies. But with active management, development, and marketing by a team, the currency cannot credibly demonstrate that it is not controlled by these individuals. With a group of developers in control of the majority of coins, processing power, and coding expertise, the currency is practically a centralized currency where the interests of the team dictate its development path. (254)

Today, this even begins to include mega-corporations and states mulling their own initiatives to mimic some of Bitcoin’s peripheral characteristics while omitting its most significant and critical ones. Such projects see the attractions of the cryptocurrency revolution squarely in payment ease or transfer convenience and not in the prospect of a new monetary asset with unprecedented hardness.

Any group of founders and backers, whether states, corporations, or founding teams can lead or promote hard-fork alterations (254–55). For Bitcoin alone, the only corresponding founding figure was always anonymous and is now long absent, having withdrawn in 2010 and never heard from since (251–52). Bitcoin’s large number of software development contributors, node operators, and miners are organizationally and jurisdictionally independent, located worldwide.

This is a key part of Ammous’s central argument with regard to Bitcoin; its value lies in its immutability, meaning that no party is in a position to change its consensus rules (222–27).

The reason that even seemingly innocuous changes to the protocol are extremely hard to carry out is the distributed nature of the network, and the need for many disparate and adversarial parties to agree to changes whose impact they cannot fully understand, while the safety and tried-and-tested familiarity of the status quo remains fully familiar and dependable. Bitcoin’s status quo can be understood as a stable Schelling point, which provides a useful incentive for all participants to stick to it, while the move away from it will always involve a significant risk of loss. (225)

Consensus rule fixity became a bone of contention, most prominently around 2014–2017, amid debate on a series of proposals to increase Bitcoin’s 1MB block size limit. This limit restricts the amount of transaction data that can be added to the chain per block (in effect, per time period, since a new block appears on average every 10 minutes). Like the monetary policy, this is a consensus rule that can only be changed through a backward-incompatible hard fork. Each proposal failed to attract the necessary support. Disputants differed not only on opinions about the height of the limit itself, but also the wisdom and necessity of a hard fork, which is needed to change it (and speaking of Shelling points, Change it to what, exactly? There were many competing proposals).

A major argument in favor of the existing block size limit is that a significant growth in block sizes would raise the cost of operating a full node, reducing their number and making the network more vulnerable to collusion or attack. The more limited the network requirements remain, the more easily wholly independent nodes can operate in separate, unique locations. In total, an estimated 9,500 nodes—including independents along with cloud instances and institutional nodes, are reachable as of this writing. By country, the US and Germany lead, together contributing 25% and 20%, respectively.

The prevailing view in the Bitcoin community is that if the block size limit, by preserving more rather than fewer nodes, tips the balance toward added marginal catastrophe insurance for the system while still keeping it running well enough, this must be given more weight than any non-critical increase in data throughput. This is even more so when other methods exist or are in development for increasing on-chain transaction throughput via increased efficiency and transactional density. The latter refers to any method for squeezing more transactions into the same data (for current examples, see “Taproot-Schnorr Soft Fork” (17 Aug 2019) by Mike Schmidt). Such density-seeking strategies do not entail the trade-off between transaction volume and node burden that a simple increase in data capacity does. Besides increasing on-chain or “Layer 1” density, many options exist for moving transactions off-chain to various “Layer 2” venues. The old saying, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” applies.

And it is here where the precise meanings attached to ‘running well enough’ or ‘ain’t’ broke’ become critical. On this, a conflict of visions came into focus between a future of using the main chain directly as a large-scale payment system (Visa and PayPal competitor) and one of using it as a sound money system (dollar and gold competitor). Each vision suggests different priorities. A transaction capacity deemed suitable to support a digital-gold vision (ain’t broke) may be deemed insufficient to support a mass-payment-system vision (is broke). And higher capacity for the mass-payment-system vision (fixed it) implies lower security for the digital-gold vision (could break it). If these visions are indeed incompatible, which ought to take priority?

Ammous offers compelling arguments for the digital-gold vision and against the mass payments vision. Among these:

Current state-of-the-art technology in payment settlements has already introduced a wide array of options for settling small-scale payments with very little cost. It is likely that Bitcoin’s advantage lies not in competing with these payments for small amounts and over short distances; Bitcoin’s advantage, rather, is that by bringing the finality of cash settlement to the digital world, it has created the fastest method of final settlement of large payments across long distances and national borders. It is when compared to these payments that Bitcoin’s advantages appear most significant. (207)

The invention of Bitcoin has created, from the ground up, a new independent alternative mechanism for international settlement that does not rely on any intermediary and can operate entirely separate from the existing financial infrastructure. (205)

Ammous argues that Bitcoin’s status quo of economic policies, block size limit included, is ideal because it helps protect the most important value for bitcoin as digital gold, the change-resistance of its monetary policy. The functions of higher-volume transacting can be covered through other means. Even if cryptographic substitutes did not gain widespread traction, more traditional banking models could fill the gap.

Bitcoin can be seen as the new emerging reserve currency for online transactions, where the online equivalent of banks will issue Bitcoin-backed tokens to users while keeping their hoard of Bitcoins in cold storage, with each individual being able to audit in real time the holdings of the intermediary, and with online verification and reputation systems able to verify that no inflation is taking place. (206)

The block size limit and the bitcoin unit production schedule must nevertheless still be viewed as distinct phenomena in monetary-theory terms. Placing them together under an argument for the immutability of all of Bitcoin’s consensus rules does not remove this distinction.

Ammous correctly explains that the production of new bitcoin units, as an example of the production of money units, is quite unlike the production of consumer and producer goods and services. Any number of money units, provided sufficiently divisible, will do equally well for a society of money users. That pumping out ever more money units is not better, and is indeed far worse, for a society of money users as a whole is a central insight of the Austrian approach to money.

However, regarding the height of the block size limit, the immediate issue is not the number of money units produced, but the number of transactions that miners can elect to include in a candidate block. Unlike producing more money units, this is a productive service performed in exchange for specific payment. I have described this as the market for on-chain transaction-inclusion services. This exists in concert with a non-market for verification & relay services, which are only compensated indirectly, having no direct pricing mechanism.

In sum, monetary theory, for its part, hands Bitcoin a single-case special justification for having an arbitrary economic limit fixed in code, and this applies to its monetary policy only. This justification derives from a unique peculiarity of money as an economic good, and does not extend, at least not directly, to any other arbitrary economic limit, such as the block size limit.

One can conclude that the block size limit may be defensible on other grounds, but it is not as unmistakably defensible as the unit-supply schedule itself. Ammous spends the bulk of the book setting up his defense of Bitcoin’s supply schedule in particular (arguably the first 70% (Chaps 1–8)), and then in the latter part shifts to a supportive explanation of the all-inclusive inalterability of all of Bitcoin’s consensus rules (222–30), not just that of its money supply rules.

This could be tempered with a finer-grained recognition that other consensus rules do not enjoy the same degree of air-tight justifiability (from a pro-hard-money standpoint, at least) as the money supply rules in particular. This does not make these other rules indefensible, but it does show that that supporting them stands on looser, more derivative ground.

3.   The primacy of sound money over permissionless transacting

Besides Bitcoin’s monetary policy, another of its main attractions is disintermediation, or in the famous phrase from the Bitcoin white paper, the elimination of “trusted third parties.” Bitcoin can be used to transfer value over arbitrary distance without contracting with an intermediary service. It is cash-over-internet.

Some early enthusiasts and promoters seemed to view Bitcoin’s leading contribution as freeing the people for permissionless transacting. A trusted third party is in a position to refuse service based on identity or purpose, reflecting internal corporate policies or jurisdictional prohibitions. Early in Bitcoin’s history, the promise of permissionless transacting fueled the rise of Silk Road and later other Bitcoin-mediated prohibition-resistance marketplaces.

One critique of the digital gold vision for Bitcoin is that increased reliance on off-chain Layer 2 services could recapitulate old-school intermediation, bringing back trusted third parties in new hats, and standing between most ordinary users and Bitcoin’s promise of disintermediation. Instead of end users holding bitcoin (historically, gold coins), they will be limited to using bitcoin substitutes for the most part (historically, paper notes and deposit entries), which could then be inflated far more freely.

However, intermediation in Bitcoin is not of the “standing between” type since nothing forbids end users from employing Layer 1 themselves, either directly or as a means of auditing Layer 2 services, the latter completely unprecedented in the gold case. Moreover, unlike historical gold-based currencies, Bitcoin has no favored legal status. Layer 2 options can only attract users if they provide some service that these users prefer. For example, certain Layer 2 bitcoin substitutes could come to offer privacy, speed, cost, and other advantages over Layer 1 bitcoin. Layer 2 units could overcome their own drawbacks (principally, that of not being on-chain bitcoin) by offering counterbalancing values that give them a net advantage for various applications. In the case of cryptographic substitutes, they can form a direct link to specific on-chain bitcoin units, making their “backing” specific rather than pooled, and therefore easier to audit.

Intermediation as such can be a natural outcome of the hierarchical structure of economic specialization and the division of labor. It is most likely unobjectionable provided that it occurs within a voluntary context, which can make it a benefit rather than uninvited meddling. The natural, emergent hierarchies and structures of the voluntary sector must be carefully distinguished from the compulsory-sector hierarchies that the state nurtures and sustains through force and threats.

Using on-chain bitcoin directly remains permissionless in that the network is open to any node running compatible software. The significance of eliminating trusted third parties persists in that any party can join Layer 1 and interact directly with any other party on it without permission. All that is required—from the standpoint of Bitcoin itself—is suitable hardware, consensus-compatible software, and network connectivity, no permission slips.

However, this in no way implies a certain costlessness of joining the network, and it does not mean that Layer 1 must remain suited to any imagined use at any wished-for cost level.­­ If eventually the typical Layer 1 user were a Layer 2 intermediary or financial institution, this would have been the outcome of a voluntary-sector evolution toward improved performance at global scale. Bitcoin would still be providing a non-inflationary monetary base open to direct access by anyone who valued it sufficiently to join the network. Open entry is not the same as costless entry. And from a market-oriented perspective, it is openness of entry that is critical to competitive health.

This contrasts with the current money and banking system built on nationally and internationally managed fiat money, created and maintained to facilitate the inflation- and debt-financing of the interventionist state and its long follower-train of profiting cronies. Unlike Bitcoin, which is open to all entrants, direct participation in key roles in the conventional money and banking system is restricted to vetted cartel members and well-trained, paid sympathizers.

But a closed system built from the ground up to run on rotten money cannot be fundamentally reformed. An open system built on sound money is capable of reforming itself through continuous improvement in the context of free competition.

Bitcoin could represent a “decentralized alternative to central banking” in that any individual or institution can join without a cartel membership and begin to interact with any other party on the network regardless of geographic location or political jurisdiction. The size and composition of such parties and the uses to which they put Layer 1, for direct use or service provision, would naturally evolve with time and social progress. However, bitcoin’s monetary hardness and direct auditability makes it an unsuitable base for the inflation-pyramiding schemes of conventional banking as we know it.

It is important to recall that banking as such is not inherently corrupt; instead, it is corrupt in that it is operated as a state-orchestrated cartel running on unsound money. Key services that banking offers are something that people want to use.

In the midst of the very common anti-bank rhetoric that is popular these days, particularly in Bitcoin circles, it is easy to forget that deposit banking is a legitimate business which people have demanded for hundreds of years around the world. People have happily paid to have their money stored safely so they only need to carry a small amount on them and face little risk of loss. (237)

Between Bitcoin’s two features of providing sound money and permissionless transacting, the first is of far greater significance, the second more a functional support. Engagement in mutually consensual commercial association in the face of unjust restrictions offers an annoyance to the existing system of rule, but one that is addressable through forensic procedures and totalitarian justice, as several pioneers of bitcoin-mediated prohibition-resistance marketplaces have discovered to their detriment.

Bitcoin has also been touted more generally for its always-on service and borderless convenience for payments and transfers. However, conventional financial systems and services, awakened from incumbent slumber by upstart cryptocurrency competition, can readily improve the speed, availability, and pricing of their own online payment and transfer offerings, and have been doing so.

In contrast, Bitcoin’s unique and durable competitive advantage lies elsewhere—in its unprecedented monetary hardness. A paradigm shift away from fiat-money mediated, politically controlled central banking is of wider-reaching potential impact than either individual permissionless transacting or added convenience. It is a path beyond major systemic drawbacks of the modern nation-state system. The steady heat of a hard money alternative could gradually evaporate the conventional system’s corrupt lifeblood—its ever-depreciating fiat money—the shadowy chief financier of its socially destructive inflation- and debt-ridden practices.

As a bonus, over the longer-term, such a monetary revolution could also aid in getting beyond the conventional system’s primitive meddling in mutually consensual matters, a major driver of interest in permissionless transacting to begin with. In Thoreau’s formulation, “there are a thousand hacking at the branches of evil to one who is striking at the root.” Individual-level permissionless transacting can ultimately only hack at the branches of the modern state’s evils whereas the mere existence of a sound money alternative strikes at their root.

4.   As Bitcoin gradually eats the world of monetary assets…

The Bitcoin Standard makes the case that Bitcoin is not only analogous to the classical gold standard, but in important respects has at least the theoretical potential to be superior to it. For those already versed in hard-money-oriented Austrian-school approaches, as well as those brought up to speed by reading this book, the enormity of this potential contribution to society will stand out. Bitcoin could in the longer term come to fill the most neglected niche of all, sound base money, the production rate of which cannot be increased by any party—private or public, individual or institutional.

Bitcoin can be understood as a sovereign piece of code, because there is no authority outside of it that can control its behavior. Only Bitcoin’s rules control Bitcoin, and the possibility of changing these rules in any substantive way has become extremely impractical as the status-quo bias continues to shape the incentives of everyone involved in the project. (253)

In light of common warnings about how risky Bitcoin is, that it is unproven, that its market price is volatile, that managing it requires specialized knowledge and practice and that access to its units can be lost, there could also be risks to shunning it altogether. What if it succeeds?

Ammous recounts episodes when a money with a superior stock/flow ratio has driven out a money with a lesser one. This includes gold driving out silver (31–33), as well as several more obscure historical cases (16). Each time, those left holding the demonetizing assets—in some cases specific central banks and residents of the corresponding countries—have suffered steady, serious, and permanent wealth losses.

Ammous estimates that, “around the year 2022, Bitcoin’s stock-to-flow ratio will overtake that of gold, and by 2025, it will be around double that of gold and continue to increase quickly into the future while that of gold stays roughly the same (199).” The very strongest of the fiat currencies, the Japanese yen and the Swiss franc, equaled Bitcoin’s stock/flow ratio back in 2017 (198), but Bitcoin has by now surpassed them.

If Bitcoin’s relative stock/flow ratio does indeed help enable it to eat the world of monetary assets, it can take its time enjoying the meal. Major transitions would take time, with twists and turns along the way, and catastrophic risks can never be wholly eliminated. Since this is an all-voluntary system, however, transitions can only proceed along opt-in paths, in which each individual and institution decides at the margins that its next step is likely to be in its own interests.

In the meantime, anyone who has not read The Bitcoin Standard should do so. The highlights above can only indicate some of the key outcomes of a detailed, well-supported presentation. Beginners will be brought up to speed in an engaging fashion, while even those already well-versed in both Austrian economics and Bitcoin are likely to come away with both new details and an integrated, readable narrative that never loses sight of that which is most important and remarkable about Bitcoin, its potential to become a hard monetary unit in a soft age of inflation.

"Bitcoin 2014 Panel: History of Money & Lessons for Digital Currencies Today" with time-based outline

Following the Economic Theory of Bitcoin panel on 17 May 2014 at the Bitcoin Foundation Conference in Amsterdam, I also participated in this one-hour panel addressing the history of money and lessons for digital currencies today (my own contributions start at 41:40). The varied topics included lessons from the history of the Netherlands, problems with the deflationary spiral argument, parallels to the early history of the oil industry, competition and types of centralization, historical circulation of multiple monetary metals and relevance for altcoins, and the role and operation of central banks relative to market competition and centralization versus decentralization.

Moderator: Ludwig Siegele (Online Business and Finance Editor, The Economist)

Speakers: Tuur Demeester (Founder, Adamant Research), Konrad Graf (Author & Investment Research Translator), Simon Lelieveldt (Regulatory Consultant, SL Consultancy), Erik Voorhees (Co-Founder, Coinapult)

1) Introductions

00:00–05:50 Introductions by each panelist

2) History of money in Amsterdam (Lelieveldt)

06:10–10:58 Lelieveldt: Amsterdam monetary history; water and community power more outside usual royal vested interests. Amsterdam Exchange Bank cleaned up confusion of many coins in circulation. Guilder was a unit of account without existing as a physical coin anymore, making it a virtual unit of account at the time. Human mind can adapt to and use many different things as currency.

3) Putting the “deflationary spiral” to rest (Voorhees)

10:58–19:07 Hyperdeflationary bitcoin economy hasn’t fallen apart. Opposite: more bitcoins spent when value is rising (wealth effect). Academics cite deflationary spiral as truism, but bitcoin shifts the burden of proof back onto supporters of the idea. Calling the gold standard “rigid” was a justification for control. Increasing the number of monetary units about as useful as increasing the length of an inch.

4) Parallels from history of the oil industry (Demeester)

19:07–28:18 Invitation to academics to launch altcoins representing their favorite monetary policy. Nothing else as disruptive as bitcoin in the history of money, but parallels with history of oil. Not approved by intellectuals or establishment. New innovations raise customer expectations. Academics may avoid taking bitcoin seriously for fear of ostracism from old paradigm.

5) Centralization, impact of licensing on competition, wealth transfer (general)

28:18–41:40 Multiple panelists and audience: Don’t waste time thinking about what (you think) bankers and others think. Oil and the internet were both fragmented originally, but centralization followed. What about bitcoin? Distinction between market-based centralization and coercive, legally privileged centralization. Wealth transfer, innovation, and social opinion.

6) Was the “gold standard” really the free market money of the old days? (Graf)

41:40–49:52 “Money production” an industry that can be examined ethically. Mining a specific service performed with compensation, but literally creating money “out of thin air” an illicit wealth transfer. Gold arrived at leading position through multiple government interventions. Litecoin as silver a weak metaphor. Question simplistic summary images as representations of actual history. [Here is a more detailed write-up on this topic that I posted after the conference: Gold standards, optionality, and parallel metallic- and crypto-coin circulations (21 May 2014)].

7) Q & A and discussion (general)

49:52–62:00 Central banks and money creation. Money another good in the economy or separate? Bankruptcy helpfully eliminates damaging institutions. New money creation leads to visible effects, but unhelpful for society overall; transfers wealth from some people to others. Trigger events for financial collapse? Dominoes collapse starting with weaker economies, periphery. Watch for rising interest rates.

Gold standards, optionality, and parallel metallic- and crypto-coin circulations

Source: Biswarup Ganguly, Wikimedia Commons. Copper coin, 1782-1799 CE, Tipu Sultan ReignWhen one hears the words “gold standard,” it is usually either from people who think it was a horrible thing or people who think it was a wonderful thing. However, many in both groups seem to agree that “the” gold standard represents the free market money of the good old days, or the bad old days, or perhaps even the future.

However, the inclusion of the word “standard” could already serve as a warning that this may have been just another convoluted sequence of confused government programs. Looking into this more closely may suggest lessons for cryptocurrencies today.

Several different international monetary orders from 1871–1971 were based on gold: the classical gold standard, the gold exchange standard, and the Bretton Woods system. Yet these came only after a long series of previous legal interventions in money of various types. When such legal measures were absent or weaker, things tended to differ. Professor Guido Hülsmann characterizes it broadly this way on p. 46 of The Ethics of Money Production:

In the Middle Ages, gold, silver, and copper coins, as well as alloys thereof, circulated in overlapping exchange networks. At most times and places in the history of Western Europe, silver coins were most widespread and dominant in daily payments, whereas gold coins were used for larger payments, and copper coins in very small transactions. In ancient times too, this was the normal state of affairs.

One dramatic way that monetary metals were driven out of circulation was the policy of bimetallism. People we might today call “regulators” legally fixed the exchange rate between silver coins and gold coins to make the market more “regular.” The actual result was the rapid loss of a major component of the money supply from circulation. Hülsmann on p. 130:

One famous case in which bimetallism entailed fiat inflation-deflation was the British currency reform of 1717, when Isaac Newton was Master of the Mint. Newton proposed a fiat exchange rate between the (gold) guinea and the (silver) shilling very much equal to the going market rate. Yet parliament, ostensibly to “round up” the exchange rate of gold, decreed a fiat exchange rate that was significantly higher than the market rate. And then some well-positioned men helped the British citizens to replace their silver currency with a gold currency.

Hülsmann then cites similar cases in the US in 1792 and 1834. Not only did price fixing not make the market more “regular” as intended, it caused severe disruptions, with many losers, some winners, and a certain period of monopoly metal circulation.

The parallel circulation of metals may in this way have represented relatively more of a “free market money” situation than government orchestrated gold standards that arrived only after long sequences of legal manipulations—and which just happened to also channel the majority of gold into the vaults of monetary-system orchestrators.

Lessons for parallel cryptocoin circulations?

Such parallel circulation has been used as an analogy to promote parallel cryptocurrencies in a complementary monetary role. How well does this analogy hold up?

Each metal filled a different market role from the others, with some overlap. Likewise, each altcoin advertises different features. How significant will users perceive such differences to be?

The main difference between copper, silver, and gold was a large distinction in a practical characteristic, one unmistakeably clear and important to the end user—exchange value per unit of weight. A single gold coin could do the work of a handful of silver ones or a hefty pile of copper ones, whereas buying a few potatoes with gold instead of copper would have been quite a technical challenge in the opposite way.

However, this particular factor—probably the most important one from the case of metals—does not apply to cryptocurrencies, which can be divided and combined freely and have no weight. Perhaps some other factors will prove significant enough to create a similar degree of differentiation, but the final say goes to the market test, not the engineering imagination. Another significant difference among cryptocurrencies is the amount of hashing power protecting each chain. This is a factor, in contast, for which minimal significant parallel exists in the case of monetary metals (the closest thing would probably be relative differences in forgeability).

In considering a given cryptocoin from a monetary viewpoint, it is important to investigate and consider its actual patterns of use. Having the word “coin” in the name does not make it a monetary unit. What does? One sign is the extent and scale to which users are holding a unit so as to buy goods and services with it. This might contrast, for example, with an income purpose (buying and selling the asset against another monetary unit in pursuit of monetary gains), or social-signaling purposes such as giving out microtips to online commenters. Each altcoin or appcoin might fill different roles and provide different kinds of value to users, perhaps within particular sub-cultures, or perhaps in the context of particular services. Coins can apparently fill some of these functions without having to gain much traction in a more general monetary role.

In contrast to this, a central function of holding cash and other liquid balances is to address the uncertainty of the future and this is a general function—the more general, the better fulfilled. For example, we may know that we will want to buy some things in the future, but not necessarily know exactly which things, when, where, and at precisely what prices. Cash balances, due to their flexibility, enable us to adjust to such constellations of uncertainties. In this sense, a unit that is more widely accepted is likely to come in handy in a wider range of such future situations than one that is less widely accepted (there are also other factors to consider besides generality of acceptance, such as whether the units are expected to tend to gain or lose value while being held in balances).

I suspect that only significant traction in such a general monetary use, such as bitcoin has begun to gain, could sustain a large increase in a given unit’s purchasing power over the longer term through the network-effect process I have termed hyper-monetization.

There is a strong tendency in a trading network toward the use of a single monetary unit. This theoretical insight has sometimes been extended to the historical claim that this is the natural role of gold, or the forward-looking claim that gold should fill this role in an ideal future. However, other factors also push back in the opposite direction toward parallel circulations and multiple options. Such factors could be natural, such as we saw with large practical differences among different monetary metals, or political, such as the legal favoring of some monies in combination with the geographic sectioning off of the total trading universe.

One option is not really an option

Finally, adaptive systems and species that survive for a very long time tend to have some redundancies in critical systems. There is no single more critical system for the functioning of civilization than indirect exchange using money and other monetary units. A repeated theme in the history of money, however, has been actions by rulers that have the effect, whether intended or not in any given case, of removing alternatives and opt-out paths for money users, leaving them highly vulnerable to whatever happens with the remaining monopoly unit.

If a society has a single dominant monetary unit for whatever reason, it would seem favorable from this larger vulnerability assessment or antifragility perspective for its members to have other viable options at least waiting in the wings in parallel operation. Use of a single money certainly has strong advantages, but while network effects and broadness of acceptance are very large factors, they should not be mistaken for being the only ones.

In particular, use of one unit with no alternatives available does not address the need for adaptation to unexpected events. The complete absence of freely chooseable and ready alternatives makes a society more vulnerable to the effects of large-scale shocks. Points often lost on central planners of all schools are that redundancies and parallel options tend to have unexpected very long-term survival value, that more options are often better than fewer, and that having only one “option” is similar to having no option at all.

Recommended related books:

Jörg Guido Hülsmann, The Ethics of Money Production (2008)

Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Antifragile: Things that Gain from Disorder (2012)

REVIEW | The Ethics of Money Production by Jörg Guido Hülsmann

Business ethics, or at least violating them, if the media is to be believed, is all the rage. The Ethics of Money Production is the first in-depth look (well, the second; the first, as Hülsmann points out, was written 700 years ago by a French Bishop) at the ethics of making money. Not the business of earning money, but the business of producing it.

Money production has been monopolized by the state for so long that it is difficult for us to even conceive of it is a business. The very idea sounds like science fiction. But might this not be in the good sense of science fiction, the sense in which it invites us to question fundamentals and consider what else is possible?

Money production is a business, one that happens to be a state monopoly, generating massive financial gain for the state in multiple layers. Like any business, even a state monopoly, money production ought to be viewable from the perspective of business ethics.

Is the monopolization of money production by the state really necessary, wise, or ethical, or is it simply a practice of long standing that needs to be called into serious question? The Ethics of Money Production takes on just this challenge from both ethical and economic perspectives.

For me, this book came at the end of a concentrated series of readings I did on money and banking issues. Years earlier, I had read several works in the free banking literature from Larry White, George Selgin, and Kevin Dowd, but this time my readings included The Case Against the Fed, The Mystery of Banking, Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles and a series of more recent back-and-forth academic articles on the fractional reserve vs. 100% reserve debate. Even after all this, Hülsmann's volume had a number of unique and important perspectives and insights to offer.

While it is simply stated, it covers a tremendous breadth, touching on all the key issues at just the right level of detail to make it accessible without oversimplifying. It squarely addresses the issues from both ethical and utilitarian angles while clearly distinguishing which is which. It gives priority to the ethical. If something is just plain wrong, there is no basis for excusing it on some set of utilitarian grounds. Nevertheless, the author is also in thorough command of all the utilitarian arguments made in favor of what he identifies as unethical money production, and he examines them all, finding each to also be flawed or self-contradictory on purely economic grounds.

He finds that there has been no real attempt to defend conventional statist monetary practices on ethical grounds at all, and indeed, he can uncover no non-utilitarian ethical grounds in support of such practices to even address. Moreover, he finds substantial grounds for condemning these practices as fraudulent and socially destructive on many levels, from both ethical and purely economic standpoints.

He summarizes the forms that this destruction takes. The continuous loss of value of everyone's money discourages saving, responsibility, and long-term planning and thereby even assists in the break-down of family bonds and other institutions of civil society. The sole beneficiary is the state itself and its closest friends, the banks that help finance its activities beyond what the citizens would be willing to pay in visible taxes.

Inflationary financing is essential to state power, to its wars, to its expansion, to the consolidation of its domination of its subjects. Control of money is a central, if not the central, strategic issue in the strength of the state, providing the state with a nearly limitless means of financing itself at the expense of its subjects in a way that is hidden from, and quite mysterious to, most of them.

What is new in The Ethics of Money Production?

Hülsmann goes even further than his predecessors in imagining the conditions of free market money production. A key weakness in previous formulations was a working assumption that only one type of metal would form a circulating monetary unit. However, it is quite possible that more than one could function in parallel for different purposes. There is no need to have an arbitrary, state-imposed "bimetalist" exchange rate between metals, which has historically driven one or another metal out of circulation whenever the market rate for it exceeded the official rate. In a truly free market for money, gold could end up being used for higher-end transactions and savings, and silver and/or copper coins for everyday transactions. He mentions historical precedent for such arrangements where, for brief periods, the state has not banned them. The metal rates would obviously have to float, as all state-manufactured bimetalist disasters and Gresham's Law-generated deflations in history have clearly demonstrated.

Multiple, freely floating monetary metal currencies are also defensive for the monetary order as a whole. If one metal begins to become corrupted or weakened for any reason, it is easy for consumers to switch to another at the margin. This helps preserve monetary stability, tending to mitigate and rebalance speculative value shifts, and preserves for consumers the ability to quickly and dynamically shift away from any potential problem areas. This is exactly the same consumer power that the state has always sought to take away in order to protect its sad parade of monopolistic funny-money schemes. The essential point is to have total monetary freedom, which means that people are never forced to accept money they do not wish to, and are free to use any money they do wish to.

The book also pointed out a subtle error in previous monetary standard formulations. Saying that "an ounce" of a certain grade of a metal is the monetary unit is not clear enough. Rather, it may be better for the unit to be a specified type of coin that contains this amount of metal.

It is costly to mint coins. If the monetary unit is not specified as a coin, a debt of 100 ounces could be paid, for example, with 100-oz. bar instead of 100 coins. However, the bar is quite likely to be less valuable than the coins because of liquidity differences and minting costs. The market solution would likely be to make a specified type of coin itself function as the contractual monetary unit. If someone wanted to pay in bullion, it would have to be discounted so that the value of the 100-oz. bar, for example, would be lower than the value of 100 of the minted coin units, and a balance would be due in addition to the bar.

Understanding this means taking yet another step toward the consistent application of the subjective theory of value in monetary theory. In this scenario, the bar, even though of the same metal, is not the money; it is just another commodity. This is because "money" is an economic rather than a physical concept. The coin, in this example, would be the "money," but not the bar.

As Hülsmann shows, all such problems, such as confusion as to the actual monetary unit, ultimately arise from the state arrogating to itself the right to set arbitrary "standards," which inevitably have some flaw in them that leads to problems that people operating in free markets could easily have solved and would not have generated.

But the state does this for a reason: it profits. That it profits at the expense of its subject population, should be the first point taught in any exposition of monetary theory. In state-run educational institutions, however, how much prominence is this point likely to be given?

As expected, it is hidden as well as it can be. The author shines light on it for all to see and shows a way forward that is at the same time more ethical, economically sounder, and truer.

Prices should be falling

The long-term price level should be falling due to productivity growth. The fiat money monopolists' grand concern about how far inflation is above zero is silly. Keeping the price level flat is still a massive form of theft out of the pockets of every net positive holder of the state-mandated currency (other than some of the first recipients of new infusions). This is because the price level not only should not be rising, it should not be flat either. Indeed, it should be falling, as it did in terms of gold before the replacement of real money with paper monopoly tickets issued by state cronies.

The creation and near universal spread of the image that as long as inflation is not too far above zero, everything is fine, is a massive delusion, which masks a truly mind-boggling embezzlement racket. Even if central banks did manage zero inflation, the fact that prices were not falling with ongoing economic progress would indicate the ongoing degree of currency depreciation relative to the progress of the real economy.

What is "currency depreciation?" In the case of fiat money systems, it is embezzlement of the savings of every single person all the time everywhere. Rather than steal particular pieces of money, treasuries, central banks, and their cronies steal portions of the value of all the money that exists (leaving it all where it is in cash and deposits), and divert it into their very own newly printed notes and newly infused magical deposit credits for Wall Street. No mere private bandit could ever dream of running and maintaining such a crime syndicate.

What's the defense? A couple of possibilities. Own tangible assets (buildings, metals) and minimize holdings of fiat currency. Another—commonly adopted in the US, but not necessarily recommended—is to be in debt. Currency depreciation harms those with positive net cash and benefits those with negative net cash (the devaluation of a negative creates a double-negative and therefore a positive). No wonder there are so many in debt. Saving in fiat money is punished.